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Node ASN of Node Out-Degree # of Children at Sinkhole 
1 Everyone's Internet (AS 13749) 36,875 12 
2 lquest (AS 7332) 32,159 7 
3 UUNet (AS 701) 31,682 5 
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5 E-xpedient (AS 17054) 19,530 4 
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
FI GS. lA and lB illustrates a system and method for botnet 
creation. 
FIGS. 2A-9B illustrate several methods of detecting and 
disrupting botnets using DNS monitoring and sinkholing, 
according to several embodiments of the invention. 
FIGS. 10-16 illustrate several methods for detecting and 
disrupting botnets using DNSBL monitoring, according to 
several embodiments of the invention. 
FIGS. 17-22 illustrates methods for detecting and disrupt-
ing botnets using DNS cache snooping, according to several 
embodiments of the invention. 
DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS OF THE 
INVENTION 
Dynamic DNS Monitoring and Sinkholing 
In one embodiment, the present invention is a method and 
system for identifying and/or attacking botnets. A bot is a 
robot or compromised computer that is used to carry out an 
attack. Examples of attacks include, but are not limited to, 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks, hosting dis-
tributed phishing pages, and key cracking. A botnet is a col-
lection of bots. Botnets are composed of the bot victims 
reaped from different viruses, worms and Trojans. Thus, bot-
nets are often referred to as viruses, worms or Trojans, 
depending on the context. The original infections compel the 
victim bots to run bot programs, which allow for remote 
administration. 
Botnet Creation 
To better understand how to detect and respond to botnets, 
an example pattern of botnet creation is presented in FIGS. 
lA and lB. FIG. lA illustrates a system ofbotnets utilized in 
2 
DDNS service 15, a resolution service that facilitates frequent 
updates and changes in computer locations. Each time the 
botnet C&C computer 25 is shut down by authorities, the 
botnet authors merely create a new C&C computer 25, and 
update the DDNS entry. The bot computers 10 perform peri-
odic DNS queries and migrate to the new C&C location. This 
practice is known as bot herding. 
FIG. lB illustrates a method of utilizing botnets for an 
attack. In 105, the malware authors (e.g., VX) purchases one 
10 
or more domain names (e.g., example.com), perhaps using a 
stolen account. The newly purchased domain names are ini-
tially parked at 0.0.0.0 (reserved for unknown addresses). A 
DNS or DDNS service can be used, in one embodiment. In 
15 115, the malware author 5 hard-codes the purchased domain 
names into dropper programs, which are sent to the victim bot 
computers 10 so that the victim bot computers 10 will contact 
the domain name servers. The dropper programs are pro-
grams that have been designed or modified to install a worm 
20 and/or virus onto a victim bot computer 10. In 120, the mal-
ware author 5 creates a C&C computer 25 for victim bot 
computers 10 to use to communicate. The C&C computer 25 
can be, for example, a high-bandwidth compromised com-
puter, or a high-capacity co-located box. The C&C computer 
25 25 can be set up to run an IRC service to provide a medium for 
the bots to communicate. Note that other services can be used, 
such as, but not limited to: web services, on-line news group 
services, etc. In 125, the malware author 5 will arrange for 
DNS resolution of domain name and register with DDNS 
30 service 15. The IP address provided for in the registration is 
for the C&C computer 25. As DNS propagates, more victim 
bot computers 10 join the network, and within a day, the hot 
army swells. The victims who contact the C&C computer 25 
are compelled to perform a variety of tasks, such as, for 
35 example, but not limited to: updating their Trojans, attacking 
other computers, etc. Whena DDNS server revokes a contract 
for DNS service, the malware author 5 (i.e., botmaster) just 
moves on, and secures DNS from yet another company. If the 
co-location service revokes the C&C contract (or cleans the 
40 box, in the case where the malware author 5 has used a 
compromised C&C computer 25), the malware author 5 just 
rents or steals another C&C computer 25. 
Detecting Botnets 
FIGS. 2A-2C illustrate a system and method of detecting 
45 and disrupting the communications between botnets and their 
victim bot computers 10. 
FIG. 2C illustrates A system for detecting a first network of 
compromised computers in a second network of computers, 
comprising: a computer including DNS detection software 
50 265, adapted to be connected to a network 250 and DNS data 
for the network 250, the DNS detection software 265 capable 
of: collecting DNS data for the network 250; examining the 
collected data relative to DNS data from known comprised 
and/or uncompromised computers 235 in the network 250; 
an attack. FIG. lA illustrates a malware author 5, a victim 
cloud of bot computers 10, a Dynamic Domain Name System 
(DDNS) server 15, and a Command & Control (C&C) com-
puter 25. Upon infection, each bot computer 10 contacts the 
C&C computer 25. The malware author 5 (i.e., a hacker, 
denoted as VX) uses the C&C computer to observe the con-
nections and communicate back to the victim bot computers 
10. Often, more than one C&C computer 25 is used. If not, a 
single abuse report can cause the C&C computer 25 to be 
quarantined or the account suspended. Thus, malware authors 60 
use networks of computers to control their victim bot com-
puters 10. Internet Relay Chat (IRC) networks are often uti-
lized, as they are very resilient, and designed to resist hacker 
attacks. Because many public IRC networks are now 
patrolled by hacker-resistant software, botnets are migrating 65 
to private, non-IRC compliant services. In addition, malware 
authors 5 often try to keep their botnets mobile by using 
55 and determining the identity of compromised computers in 
the network 250 based on the examination. 
FIG. 2A, as does FIG. lA, illustrates a malware author 5, a 
victim cloud of bot computers 10, a Dynamic Domain Name 
System (DDNS) server 15, and a Command & Control 
(C&C) computer 25. However, FIG. 2A also includes a sink-
hole computer 20. The IP address of the C&C computer 25 is 
replaced with the IP address of the sinkhole computer20. The 
sinkhole computer is used to hold traffic redirected from 
another computer. This way, the network of bot computers 10 
is isolated from the C&C computer(s), and the botnet loses 
the ability to act as a coordinated group. Although it is also 
helpful to clean up the victim computers, this requires coor-
US 8,566,928 B2 
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dination among different networks and can take time. How-
ever, disrupting the C&C can deal an immediate blow to the 
botnet. 
4 
the mix of users.) This lets botmasters create multiple, redun-
dant DDNS services for their networks, all using the same 
SLD. 
By comparison, most normal users usually do not employ 
subdomains when adding subcategories to an existing site. 
For example, if a legitimate company owns "example.com" 
and wants to add subcategories of pages on their web site, 
they are more likely to expand the URL (e.g., "example.com/ 
products") instead using a 3LD subdomain (e.g., "product-
FIG. 2B illustrates the method of detecting and disrupting 
the communications between botnets and their victim bot 
computers 10. In 205, the Command and Control (C&C) 
computer 25 of the botnet (network of attacking compro-
mised computers) is identified, as explained below with 
respect to FIG. 3. In 210, the IP address of the C&C computer 
25 is replaced with the IP address of the sinkhole computer 
20. In 215, the bot computers 10 looking up the C&C com-
puter 25 will be told to contact the sinkhole computer 20 
instead. In 220, when a bot computer 10 contacts the sinkhole 
computer 20, the sinkhole computer 20 will record the IP 
address of the bot computer 10. In 225, traffic from the bot 
computers 10 to the sinkhole computer 20 can be utilized to 
detect and disrupt communications in the botnet. 
10 s.example.com"). This lets novice web developers create new 
content cheaply and quickly, without the need to perform 
complicated DNS updates (and implement virtual host check-
ing in the web server) following each change to a web site. 
Thus, normal users tend to have a single domain name 
FIG. 3 illustrates how a botnet's C&C computer can be 
identified. In 305, domain and subdomain information is used 
to determine whether a bot computer's DNS (Dynamic Name 
System) request rate is normal or suspicious. In 310, ifthe bot 
computer's DNS request rate is determined to be suspicious, 
15 (with subcategories of content hanging off the URL), while 
bot computers tend to use mostly subdomains. Of course, 
botmasters could decide to exclusively use SLDs for their 
botnets instead of3LDs, but this doubles their cost (because 
each domain name must be purchased in addition to the 
20 original SLD) and increases the number of potentially risky 
financial transactions (that may lead to traceback) required to 
create the network. 
it is determined if it has an exponential request rate (e.g., 
periodic spikes). In addition, the exponential request rate can 25 
also be utilized when the first filter of 305 is otherwise inef-
fective, such as, but not limited to, for analysis of low-and-
slow spreading worms and/or viruses. 
Thus, to determine the number of3LDs, in 405, for a given 
SLD, the canonical SLD DNS request rate is calculated. The 
canonical SLD request rate is defined as the total number of 
requests observed for all the 3LDs present in a SLD, plus any 
request to the SLD. We use the term ISLDI to represent the 
number of3LDs observed in a given SLD. Thus, ifthe SLD 
"example.com" has two subdomains "one.example.com" and FIG. 4A illustrates the details of how the domain and 
subdomain information is used to determine whether a bat's 
DNS request rate is normal, as set forth above in 305. A DNS 
30 "two.example.com", then its ISLDl=2. For a given SLD,, with 
rate RsLD;' we calculate its canonical rate CsLD; as: 
is a hierarchical system by which hosts on the Internet have 
both domain name addresses, such as "example.com", and IP 
addresses (such as 192.17.3.4). When a user types in a DNS 35 
name ("example.com"), a DNS application makes a DNS 
request by passing the DNS name and waiting for a response, 
such as the corresponding IP address or an error. DNS 
requests can be classified as either second-level domain 
(SLD) requests, such as "example.com", or third-level sub- 40 
domainrequests (3LD), such as "foo.example.com". To avoid 
increased costs and additional risks, botmasters often create 
botnets within 3LDs, all under a common SLD. For example, 
a botmaster may purchase the string "example.com" from a 
registrar, and then also purchase DDNS service for the 3LDs 45 
"botnetl .example.com", "botnet2.example.com", and so on. 
The botmasters use subdomains in order to avoid the purchase 
of a new domain name with each new botnet, e.g., 
"example! .com", "example2.com". Each purchase of a 
domain and name service involves risk. For example, the 50 
seller may be recording the originating IP for the transaction, 
and requiring the bot master to use numerous stepping stones. 
Some registrars are careful about screening and validating the 
"whois" contact information provided by the domain pur-
chaser. If the purchase is performed with stolen user accounts, 55 
there is a further risk of being caught. Since many DDNS 
providers offer subdomain packages (e.g., a few free subdo-
mains with DDNS service) this allows the botmaster to reuse 
their purchased domain and minimize both their costs and 
risk. 60 
Botmasters also see another advantage in using subdo-
mains. Even if service to a 3LD is suspended, service to other 
3LDs within the same SLD is usually not disrupted. So, if 
"obtnetl .example.com" is sent to sinkhole computer, traffic 
to "normaluser.example.com" and "botnet2.example.com" is 65 
not disrupted. (Some DDNS providers may aggressively 
revoke accounts for the entire SLD, however, depending on 
ISLDil 
CsLDi = RsLDi + .2= R3LDJ 
j=l 
where: 
RsLn=SLD request rate 
R3Ln'=3LD request rate 
i=the' SLD under consideration (i=l, 2, ... ) 
j=l, 2, .... 
Once the canonical SLD request rate is determine, in410 it 
is determined ifthe canonical SLD request rate significantly 
deviates from the mean. When put in canonical form, distin-
guishing the normal and bot computer traffic is straight for-
ward. The bottom line of FIG. 4B illustrates an average 
lookup rate for normal (i.e., non-bot) computers, in DNS 
requests per hour. An expected mean for the rate of normal 
traffic E(X)=µ. Chebyshev's inequality is then used to fix an 
appropriate threshold for the normal request rates and request 
anomalies (i.e., bot) lookups. Chebyshev's inequality equa-
tion is: 
a2 
P(IX - µI 2 t) s t 
where: 
P=the probability 
X=the rate of normal traffic 
µ=the mean of the rate of normal traffic 
t=the threshold 
a=the standard deviation 
The inequality places an upper bound on the chance that the 
difference between X andµ will exceed a certain threshold t. 
US 8,566,928 B2 
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As shown on the bottom line of FIG. 4B, normal traffic often 
uses only one SLD, and the traffic volume is low and rela-
tively stable. In comparison, as shown on the upper line of 
FIG. 4b, botnets usually use one or more busy subdomains, 
which tend to have spikes in traffic. 
FIG. SA illustrates the details of how it is determined if a 
bot' s DNS request rate has an exponential request rate, as set 
forth above in 310. In other words, the DNS density signature 
6 
d(x, y) = ~ Ix;~ Y;I 
i=O <Tj 
where: 
x,y=variable vectors (features) of the new observation and the 
trained (normal) profile 
n=the number of dimensions in the variable vectors 
10 
a=the standard deviation 
is determined. This test can be used as a second detection 
layer which can be used ifthe first filter is not effective. For 
example, the first filter could be evaded by botmasters if they 
adjust their use of3LDs or vary their DNS request rates, and 
thus blend in with normal traffic. In addition, noisy networks 
make the first filter ineffective because short-term normal and 15 
As with the canonical SLD request rate, training can be 
done using the normal model, and an appropriate threshold 
can be picked. Training can be done with a model of normal 
data, and a threshold chosen so that false positives are not 
generated. If observed traffic for a host has too great a dis-
tance score from the normal, it is deemed an outlier, and 
bot DNS rates may be very similar. An administrator may 
decide to revoke DDNS service for a host that has one or more 
"spikes" of traffic. To reduce the chance of false positives, a 
second filter can be used to examine just the hosts who have 
excessive canonical SLD scores. 
A distinguishing feature for this second filter is that botnet 
DNS request rates are usually exponential over a 24 hour 
period. The diurnal nature of bot behavior means that there 
are periodic spikes in bot requests. These spikes are caused by 
infected hosts who turn on their computers in the morning, 
releasing a sudden burst ofDNS traffic as the bots reconnect 
to the C&C computer. This spike is not present in normal 
DNS request rates, which require (usually slower and ran-
dom) user interaction to generate a DNS request. In some 
cases, flash crowds of users visiting a popular site may behave 
like a botnet, but this is rare, and likely not sustained as seen 
in botnets. 
Turning to FIG. SA, in SOS, the DNS request rates are 
sorted per hour. These sorted rates of normal DNS requests 
over a 24 hour period create a distribution, or density signa-
ture, for normal traffic. FIG. SB illustrates sorted 24-hour 
average rates for normal traffic, as compared with sorted 
botnet traffic. The normal traffic is the bottom line, and the 
botnet traffic is the top line of FIG. SB. Because of the diurnal 
spikes in traffic, the botnet traffic exhibits an exponential 
distribution. 
flagged as a bot computer. 
Because of the underlying diurnal pattern driving bot com-
20 puter name lookups, the sorted request rates only become 
distinct when grouped into clusters at least several hours in 
length. For this reason, this secondary detection system can 
also be used for low-and-slow spreading worms, and as an 
additional filtration step for noisy networks. 
25 Disrupting Botnets 
FIG. 6 illustrates several response options once a bot com-
puter is detected, as set forth above in 22S of FIG. 2B: sur-
veillance reporting 60S, DDNS removal 610, and tarpits 61S. 
Surveillance reporting 60S merely records the traffic. The 
30 sinkhole passively gathers information about attacking net-
works in a database, and keeps records on victims, activities, 
OS type/patch levels, and other relevant information. This 
data is shared with others, including individuals responsible 
for network response, Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) rout-
35 ing, and other network maintenance. Infection reports can be 
issued to monitored networks, or can be used to augment 
other intrusion detection systems, and assist law enforcement 
investigations. In addition, infection reports can be used to 
rank the number of infected individuals within Classless 
40 Interdomain Routing (CIDR) blocks and Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) for a "bot reputation" score, refusing Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) sessions from bot computers 
(to decrease spam), detecting click fraud in online advertis-
ing, or other research. 
Another response option, DDNS removal 610, is to simply 
remove the botnets DDNS entry or name registration. Once 
the traffic is deemed abusive, and measured in the sinkhole, it 
is possible to revoke the DDNS account. Moreover, it is also 
possible in some cases to revoke the domain registration used 
Turning to SlO, it is then determined ifthe sorted 24-hour 
traffic has any exponential activity. Any standard distance 45 
metric can compare the distributions. For example, the 
Mahalanbis distance can be used to measure the distance 
between request rate distributions and a normal model. (Note 
that other distance metrics can also be used.) The Mahalano-
biso distance, d, is: 50 by a botnet. Registration can be revoked where "whois" con-
tact information is missing or proven wrong. 
d2 (x,yMx-y)'C1(x-y) 
where: 
55 
x, y=variable vectors (features) of the new observation and 
the trained (normal) profile 
C=inverse covariance matrix for each member of the training 
data set 
The Mahalanobis distance metric considers the variance of 60 
An additional optional response is the use of tarpits 61S. 
There are at least two general types oftarpits: network layer 
(playing "TCP games") and application layer (honeypots). 
For network tarpits, in response to incoming bot synchronous 
(SYN) requests, bots can be sent a reset (RST), blackholed 
(i.e., given no response), sent a single acknowledgment, given 
multiple acknowledgments, or handed off to different types of 
tarpits. Routing layer (LaBrae-style) tarpits, for example, are 
easily evaded by modern multi-threaded bots. Many bot com-
puters blacklist Internet Protocols (IPs) that repeatedly tim-
eout or behave like a tarpit. Other bot computers use special 
application layer protocols or port-knocking (i.e., finding 
ports that are open) to detect tarpits and rival (hijacking) C&C 
request rates in addition to the average request rate. This 
detects outliers, and measures the consistency of the observed 
request rates with the trained (normal) samples. The Mahal-
anobis distance metric can be simplified by assuming the 
independence of each sample in the normal traffic, and there-
fore removing the covariance matrix: 
65 computers. 
For this reason, network-level tarpits are not completely 
effective against all classes of bot computers. For bot com-
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puters that have learned how to evade network-layer tarpits, 
an application-level tarpit is utilized. Many of these bot com-
puters leave the non-application level sinkhole because they 
expect a particular set of packets from the C&C computer, 
such as a port-knocking sequence or special banner message 
from an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) server. A limited proxy can 
be used to learn the appropriate hand-shake login sequence 
the bot expects. The bot computers first join the sinkhole, and 
are sent to an application-layer tarpit, also called a honeypot. 
The honeypot sends a "safe" heuristic subset of commands to 10 
the C&C computer, and observes the proper response behav-
ior. Unsafe instructions (e.g., commands to scan networks or 
download other malware) are discarded, since this might 
expose a bot computer to instructions encoded in the channel 
topic. Even custom-made, non-RFC compliant protocols, 15 
such as heavily modified IRC servers, cannot evade applica-
tion sinkholing, which slowly learns the proper sequence of 
instructions to fool the bot computers. 
8 
Diurnal Model for Single Time Zone. 
First, a closed network within a single time zone is consid-
ered. Thus, all computers in the network have the same diur-
nal dynamics. It should be noted that the diurnal property of 
computers is determined by computer user behavior (e.g., 
turning on the computer at the beginning of the day). For the 
formula below, I(t) is defined as the number of infected hosts 
at time t. S(t) is the number of vulnerable hosts at time t. N(t) 
is the number of hosts that are originally vulnerable to the 
worm under consideration. The population N(t) is variable 
since such a model covers the case where vulnerable comput-
ers continuously go online as a worm spreads out. For 
example, this occurs when a worm propagates over multiple 
days. To consider the online/offiine status of computers, the 
following definitions are used. 
I'(t)=a(t)I(t)=number of infected online hosts at time t 
S'(t)=a(t)S(t)=number of vulnerable hosts at time t 
N'(t)=a(t)N(t)=number of online hosts among N(t) Analyzing Botnets 
Modeling Prior Botnets to Predict Future Botnets. 20 To capture the situation where infected hosts are removed (e.g., due to computer crash, patching or disconnecting when 
infection is discovered), R(t) is defined as the number of 
removed infected hosts at time t. Thus: 
In addition to the responses explained above, experience 
with previous botnets can also be used to predict the behavior 
of future botnets. Botnets are very widespread, so it is helpful 
to comparatively rank them and prioritize responses. Short-
term variations in population growth can also be predicted, 25 
which is helpful because most dropper programs are short 
lived. In addition, different botnets use a heterogeneous mix 
of different infections exploiting different sets of vulnerabili-
ties, often in distinct networks, with variable behavior across 
time zones. A model that can express differences in suscep- 30 
tible populations, and gauge how this affects propagation 
speed, is useful. 
Botnets have a strongly diurnal nature. FIG. 7 illustrates a 
plot of SYN rates over time, broken down by geographic 
regions. A SYN rate is the rate of connection requests. The 35 
diurnal nature is likely because many users turn their com-
puters off at night, creating a natural quarantine period, and 
varying the number of victim computers available in a geo-
graphical region. Such significant changes in populations 
over time affects propagation rates. Thus, there are different 40 
propagation rates, depending on time zone and time of day. 
Time zones not only express relative time, but also geography. 
If there are variable numbers of infected hosts in each region, 
then the natural quarantine effect created by a rolling diurnal 
low phase can have a significant impact on malware popula- 45 
tion and growth. Thus, a model is utilized to express the 
variable number of infected hosts, time zones, and regions of 
the Internet. This model allows estimation of short-term 
population projections for a given work, based on its regional 
focus, and the time of day. The model illustrates when bot 50 
computers spread the fastest, and allow comparison of short-
term virulence of two different bot computers. This in turn 
can be used to improved surveillance and prioritize 
responses. 
dlR(t) , 
----;ft = yl (t) 
where 
y=removal parameter, since only online infected comput-
ers can be removed (e.g., patched) 
Thus, the worm propagation dynamics are: 
di l(t) = /3!' (t)S' (t) _ di R(t) 
dlt dlt 
where: 
S(t)~N(t)-I(t)-R(t) 
~=pair-wise rate of infection in epidemiology studies. 
Note that for internet worm modeling 
/3 ='_I_ 
fl 
where: 
ri=worm's scanning rate 
Q=size ofIP space scanned by the worm 
Thus, the worm propagation diurnal model is: 
di l(t) 
----;Jt = j3ci(t)I(t)[N(t) - l(t) - R(t)] -ya:(t)I(t) 
This diurnal model for a single time zone can be used to 
model the propagation of regional viruses and/or worms. For 
As illustrated in FIG. 7, the computers in each time zone 55 
are modeled as a group. The computers in each time zone 
have the same diurnal dynamics, regardless of whether they 
are infected or still vulnerable. The diurnal property of com-
puters is determined by computer user's behavior, not by the 
infection status of computers. 
As the number ofinfected computers in a region varies over 
time, a(t) is defined as the diurnal shaping function, or frac-
tion of computers in a time zone that are still on-line at time t. 
Therefore, a(t) is a periodical function with a period of 24 
hours. Usually, a(t) reaches its peak level at daytime (when 65 
users tum on their computers) and its lowest level at night 
(when users shut off their computers). 
60 example, worms and/or viruses tend to focus on specific 
geographic regions because of the language used in the e-mail 
propagation system. Similarly, worms have hard-coded 
exploits particular to a language specific version of an Oper-
ating System (OS) (e.g., a worm that only successfully attacks 
Windows XP Home Edition Polish). For these regional 
worms and/or viruses, the infection outside of a single zone is 
negligible and the infection within the zone can be accurately 
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modeled by the above formula. It should also be noted that it 
is possible to not consider the diurnal effect. To so do, a(t) is 
set equal to 1. 
Diurnal Model for Multiple Time Zones. 
Worms and/or viruses are not limited to a geographic 
region. Victim bots are usually spread over diverse parts of the 
world, but can be concentrated in particular regions, depend-
ing on how the underlying infections propagate. For example, 
some attacks target a particular language edition of an oper-
ating system, or use a regional language as part of a social 10 
engineering ploy. For example, there are worms and/or 
viruses that contain enormous look-up tables of buffer-over-
flows offset for each language edition of Windows. Similarly, 
many email spreading worms and/or viruses use a basic, 
15 pigeon English, perhaps to maximize the number of Internet 
users who will read the message and potentially open up the 
virus. These regional variations in infected populations play 
an important role in malware spread dynamics. Thus, in some 
situations it is useful to model the worm and/or virus propa-
20 gation in the entire Internet across different time zones. Since 
computers in one time zone could exhibit different diurnal 
dynamics from the ones in another time zone, computers in 
each zone are treated as a group. The Internet can then be 
modeled as 24 interactive computer groups for 24 time zones. 
25 Since many of the time zones have negligible numbers of 
computers (such as time zones spanning parts of the Pacific 
Ocean), worm propagation can be considered in K time zones 
where K is smaller than 24. For a worm and/or virus propa-
gation across different time zones, the worm propagation for 
30 
time zone i is: 
10 
where: 
n=the number of scans sent to the group from an infected 
host in each time unit; 
Q=the size of the IP space in the group 
For worms that do not uniformly scan the IP space: 
where: 
n1,=the number of scans sent to group i from an infected 
host in group j in each time unit; 
Q,=size ofIP space in group i 
Thus, when a new worm and/or virus is discovered, the 
above equation can be used by inferring the parameter ~1, 
based on a monitored honeypot behavior of scanning traffic. 
(Note that a honeypot is a computer set up to attract malicious 
traffic so that it can analyze the malicious traffic.) As noted 
above with reference to FIG. 6, many honeypot systems can 
observe all outgoing scans sent out by a trapped worm and/or 
virus. The worm's scanning target address distribution can 
therefore be inferred based on reports from multiple honey-
pots. Then 'llJ; can be derived based on the worm's scanning 
distribution. 
Thus, as illustrated in FIG. 8, equations and graphs can be 
produced showing the different effect of a virus and/or worm 
in different time zones. FIG. 8 illustrates the number of SYN 
connections sent to the sinkhole per minute from each of a 
North American group, a Europe group, and an Asia group. 
Note that all the groups shown in FIG. 8 have diurnal (i.e., 
exponential) behavior at different times of the day. Note that 
the North American and Asian groups have more noise, likely d/l(t) K d/K(t) 
-'- = '\' /3·.f'.(t)S'(t)- -'-&t L..J JI j I &t 
j=l 
which yields: 
35 because countries in these groups tend to span numerous time 
zones with large numbers of infected individuals, and China 
has one time zone for the entire country. In comparison, the 
European countries tend to occupy a single zone, and most 
victims are located in the western-most time zones. 
dff;(t) K dt = a:;(t)[N;(t) - l;(t) - R;(t)] ~ /31;0:1(t)I1(t) -y;a:;l1(t) -y;a:;(t)l;(t) 
;=l 
where: 
N,(t)=the number of online hosts at time t in time zone i 
(i=l, 2, ... K) 
S,(t)=the number of vulnerable hosts at time tin time zone 
I 
40 The diurnal models tell us when releasing a worm will 
cause the most severe infection to a region or the entire 
Internet. For worms that focus on particular regions, the 
model also allows prediction of future propagation, based on 
time of release. A table of derived shaping functions can be 
45 built, which are based on observed botnet data and other 
heuristics (e.g., the exploit used, the OS/patch level it affects, 
country of origin). When a new worm and/or virus is discov-
ered, the table for prior deviations can be consulted to forecast 
I,(t)=the number of infected online hosts at time tin time 50 
the short-term population growth of the bot, relative to its 
favored zone and time of release. 
zone 1 
R,(t)=the number of removed infected hosts at time t in 
time zone i 
Similarly, Nit), Sit), lit), Rit)=the number of hosts in 
time zone j=l, 2, ... K 
a,(t)=diurnal shaping function for the time zone i 
~1,=pairwise rate of infection from time zone j to i 
y,=removal rate of time zone i 
For a uniform-scan worm and/or virus, since it evenly 
spreads out its scanning traffic 
to the IP space: 
/31; =~·Vi, j EK 
In addition, knowing the optimal release time for a worm 
will help improve surveillance and response. To identify an 
optimal release time, the scenario is studied where the worm 
uniformly scans the Internet and all diurnal groups have the 
55 same number of vulnerable population, i.e., Nl =N2=N3. To 
study whether the worm's infection rate ~ affects the optimal 
release time, the worm's scan rate ri (remember 
60 /3= '}_) 
fl 
is changed. The study of optimal release times is useful 
because we can better determine the defense priority for two 
65 viruses or worms released in sequence. Viruses often have 
generational releases, e.g., worm.A and worm.B, where the 
malware author improves the virus or adds features in each 
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botnet can be identified using the IPs being queried by the bot. 
Analysis can be performed at the DNSBL server, and for each 
query to the DNSBL, the source IP issuing the query can be 
examined, and the subject IP being queried can also be exam-
ined. If the source IP is a known bot, then the subject IP is also 
considered to be a bot. All of the subject IPs that are queried 
by the same source IP in a short span of time are considered to 
be in the same botnet. 
If an unknown bot is performing reconnaissance, it must 
first be identified as a bot, and then the IPs it queries can also 
be identified as bots. DNSBL reconnaissance query traffic for 
botnets is different than legitimate DNSBL reconnaissance 
query traffic. FIG. 10 illustrates several methods for analyz-
new release. The diurnal model allows consideration of the 
significance of code changes that affect S(t) (the susceptible 
population). For example, if worm.A locally affects Asia, and 
worm.B then adds a new feature that also affects European 
users, there clearly is an increase in its overall S(t), and 
worm.B might become a higher priority. But when worm.B 
comes out, relative when worm.A started, plays an important 
role. For example, ifthe European users are in a diurnal low 
phase, then the new features in worm.B are not a near-term 
threat. In such a case, worm.A could still pose the greater 10 
threat, since it has already spread for several hours. On the 
other hand, if worm.Bis released at a time when the European 
countries are in an upward diurnal phase, then worm.B could 
potentially overtake worm.A with the addition of the new 
victims. 15 ing reconnaissance traffic, according to several embodiments 
of the invention. The diurnal models in FIGS. 9A and 9B exposes such a 
counter-intuitive result. FIG. 9 A illustrates worm and/ or virus 
propagation at different release times. In addition, FIG. 9B 
shows the number of infected hosts at various release times. 
Thus, as illustrated above, researchers and/or computer man-
agers are able to calculate optimal release items for worms 
and therefore rank them based on predicted short-term growth 
rates. Examples of utilizing diurnal models include, but are 
not limited to: priority ranking (short and long term), patch 
management, and/or filtration management. In priority rank-
ing, diurnal models help computer managers figure out which 
botnet needs to be addressed first because they are able to 
estimate the maximum number of infected individuals from 
each bot during each time of day. In patch management 
allows, diurnal models help a computer manager to prioritize 
patches. For example, if a computer manager knows that a 
virus related to Microsoft 2000 is impacting a certain number 
Self-Reconnaissance 
In 1005, self-reconnaissance is detected. To perform "self-
reconnaissance", the botmaster distributes the workload of 
20 DNSBL look-ups across the botnet itself such that each bot is 
looking up itself. Detecting such botnet is straightforward 
because a legitimate mail server will not issue a DNSBL 
look-up for itself. 
Single Host Third-Party Reconnaissance 
25 In 1010, single host third-party reconnaissance is detected. 
To explain third-party reconnaissance, a look-up model is 
provided in FIG. 11. FIG. 11 illustrates IP address A looking 
up IP address B, according to one embodiment of the inven-
tion. A line from node A to node B indicates that node A has 
30 issued a query to a DNSBL to determine whether node B is 
listed. 
of users at a certain time, he can use this knowledge to pri-
oritize patches performed related to other botnet threats. In 
filtration management, diurnal models help a computer man- 35 
ager to determine if certain connections should be refused 
during certain times. For example, if a computer manager 
knows that during a certain time, email traffic from China will 
A legitimate mail server both receives and sends email 
messages, and hence, will both perform look-ups (for the 
email messages it received in) and be the subject oflook-ups 
by other mail servers (for the email messages it sent out). In 
contrast, hosts performing reconnaissance-based look-ups 
will only perform queries; they generally will not be queried 
by other hosts. Legitimate mail servers are likely to be queried 
by other mail servers that are receiving mail from that server. be highly infected, he can use a filter or firewall to refuse that 
traffic during a certain time period. 
DNSBL Monitoring 
40 On the other hand, a host that is not itself being looked up by 
any other mail server is, in all likelihood, not a mail server but 
a bot. This observation can be used to identify hosts that are 
likely performing reconnaissance: looknps from hosts that 
have a low in-degree (the number oflook-ups on the bot itself 
Another method of passively detecting and identifying bot-
nets (i.e., without disrupting the operation of the botnet) is 
through revealing botnet membership using Domain Name 
System-based Blackhole List (DNSBL) counter-intelligence. 45 
DNSBL can be used to passively monitor networks, often in 
real-time, which is useful for early detection and mitigation. 
Such passive monitoring is discreet because it does not 
require direct communication with the botnet. A bot that 
sends spam messages is usually detected by an anti-spam 50 
system(s) and reported/recorded in a DNSBL, which is used 
to track IP addresses that originate spam. An anti-spam sys-
tem gives a higher spam score to a message ifthe sending IP 
address can be looked up on a DNSBL. It is useful to distin-
guish DNSBL traffic, such as DNSBL queries, that is likely 55 
being perpetrated by botmasters from DNSBL queries per-
formed by legitimate mail servers. 
Bots sometimes perform look-ups (i.e., reconnaissance to 
determine whether bots have been blacklisted) on the 
DNSBL. For example, before a new botnet is put in use for 60 
spam, the botmaster of the new botnet or another botnet may 
look up the members of the new botnet on the DNSBL. If the 
members are not listed, then the new botnet, or at least certain 
bots, are considered "fresh" and much more valuable. 
If the bot performing reconnaissance is a known bot, e.g., it 65 
is already listed on the DNSBL or it is recorded in some other 
botnet database (e.g., a private botnet database), then the new 
forthe email messages it sent out), but have a high out-degree 
(the number oflook-ups the bot performs on other hosts) are 
more likely to be unrelated to the delivery oflegitimate mail. 
In single host third-party reconnaissance, a bot performs 
reconnaissance DNSBL look-ups for a list of spamming bots. 
The in-degree (d,n) should be small because the bot is not a 
legitimate mail server and it has not yet sent a lot of spam 
messages (otherwise it will have been a known bot listed in 
DNSBL already). Thus, a look-up ratio aA is defined as: 
where: 
aA=the look-up ratio for each node A 
d,n =the in-degree for node A (the number of distinct IPs 
that issue a look-up for A). 
d0 u,=the out-degree for node A (the number of distinct IPs 
that A queries) 
Thus, utilizing the above formula, a bot can be identified 
because it will have a much larger value of a than the legiti-
mate mail servers. Single-host reconnaissance can provide 
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useful information. For example, once a single host perform-
ing such look-ups has been identified, the operator of the 
DNSBL can monitor the lookups issued by that host over time 
to track the identity of hosts that are likely bots. If the identity 
of this querying host is relatively static (i.e., if its IP address 
does not change over time, or if it changes slowly enough so 
that its movements can be tracked in real-time), a DNSBL 
operator could take active countermeasures. 
Distributed Reconnaissance 
Referring back to FIG. 10, in 1015, distributed reconnais- 10 
sance is performed. In distributed reconnaissance, each bot 
performs reconnaissance on behalf of other bots either in the 
same botnet or in other botnets. This is done because single 
host third-party reconnaissance can be easily subject to detec- 15 
tion. To remain more stealthy, and to distribute the workload 
of performing DNSBL reconnaissance, botmasters may dis-
tribute lookups across the botnet itself, having bots perform 
distributed reconnaissance. In this case, the number oflook-
ups by each bot is small and close to the number oflook-ups 20 
on the bot itself. Thus, the a value of a bot could be close to 
that oflegitimate servers. Thus, an additional method can be 
used to detect bots performing distributed reconnaissance. 
The temporal arrival pattern of queries at the DNSBL by 
hosts performing reconnaissance may differ from temporal 25 
characteristics of queries performed by legitimate hosts. With 
legitimate mail server's DNSBL look-ups, the look-ups are 
typically driven automatically when email arrives at the mail 
server and will thus arrive at a rate that mirrors the arrival rates 
of email. Distributed reconnaissance-based look-ups, on the 30 
other hand, will not reflect any realistic arrival patterns of 
legitimate email. In other words, the arrival rate of look-ups 
from a bot is not likely to be similar to the arrival rate of 
look-ups from a legitimate email server. 
FIG. 13 illustrates the process of determining whether the 35 
arrival rate of look-ups from a source IP are similar to the 
arrival rate oflook-ups from legitimate email servers, accord-
ing to one embodiment of the invention. In 1305, a list of 
kuown or probable legitimate email servers that are using the 
DNSBL service is identified. This can be done, for example, 40 
as set forth below: 
If the DNSBL is subscription-based or has access control, 
use a list of approved users (the email servers) to record the IP 
addresses that the servers use for accessing the DNSBL ser-
vice. Enter these addresses into a list of Known Mail Server 45 
IPs. 
If the DNSBL service allows anonymous access, monitor 
the source IPs of incoming look-up requests, and record a list 
14 
from the mail server, dk are recorded. The average arrival rate 
of look-ups from the mail servers over n time intervals is 
simply: 
where: 
A.,=the average look-up rate for time interval i 
dk=the number oflookups from the kuown mail server 
k=the kuown mail server 
n=the number of time intervals 
In 1315, once the look-up arrival rates from the kuown mail 
servers are learned, the average look-up arrival rate A' from a 
source IP (that is not a kuown legitimate email server or a 
kuown bot) can be analyzed over n time intervals 
In 1320, if A' is very different from each A.,, i.e., A.'-
A,=>t for all i's, where t is a threshold, the source IP is 
considered a bot. The above process of measuring the arrival 
rates of the legitimate servers is repeated for every n time 
intervals. The comparison of the arrival rate from a source IP, 
A', with the normal values, A,' s, is performed using the A' and 
A.,'s computed over the same period in time. 
FIG. 15 illustrates a method for constructing a DNSBL 
query graph, according to one embodiment of the invention. 
Referring to FIG. 15, in 1505 a set of DNSBL query logs is 
input. In 1510, the DNSBL queries are parsed to include only 
querier or queried IP addresses. In 1515, the DNSBL queries 
are then pruned to include only IP addresses which are present 
in a set B, which is a set ofkuown bot IP addresses. In 1520, 
a graph G is a DNSBL query graph constructed using the 
input from 1505-1515. G illustrates all IP addresses that are 
querier or queried by the DNSBL pruned queries. Thus, G 
illustrates all suspect IP addresses that either queried, or were 
queried by the suspect IP addresses in set B. In 1525, to 
address the situation where both the querier or queried nodes 
from the DNSBL query set are members ofB, a query graph 
extrapolation is performed. Here a second pass is made and 
edges are added if at least one of the endpoints of the edge 
(i.e., either querier or queried) is already present on the graph 
G. 
FIG. 16 is an algorithm setting forth the method explained 
in FIG. 15, according to one embodiment of the invention. 
FIG. 12 sets forth a table of nodes, found utilizing the algo-
rithm in FIG. 16, which has the highest out-degrees, and the 
number of hosts that are kuown spammers (appearing in a of unique IP addresses (hereinafter "Probable Known Mail 
Server IPs"). For each IP address in the Probably Known Mail 
Server IPs list: 
50 spam sinkhole). 
Connect to the IP address to see ifthe IP address is running 
on a kuown mail server. If a banner string is in the return 
message from the IP address, and its responses to a small set 
of SMTP commands, e.g. VRFY, HELO, EHLO, etc., match 55 
kuown types and formats of responses associated with a typi-
cal kuown mail server, then the IP address is very likely to be 
a legitimate email server, and in such a case, enter it into the 
list of Known Mail Server IPs. 
Those of skill in the art will understand that other methods 60 
may be used to compile a list of kuown legitimate email 
servers. In 1310, for each of the kuown or probable legitimate 
email servers, its look-ups to DNSBL are observed, and its 
average look-up arrival rate A., for a time interval (say, a 
10-minute interval) is derived. This can be done, for example, 65 
by using the following simple estimation method. For n inter-
vals (say n is 6), for each interval, the number of look-ups 
In addition to finding bots that perform queries for other IP 
addresses, the above methods also lead to the identification of 
additional bots. This is because when a bot has been identified 
as performing queries for other IP addresses, the other 
machines being queried by the bot also have a reasonable 
likelihood of being bots. 
The above methods could be used by a DNSBL operator to 
take countermeasures (sometimes called reconnaissance poi-
soning) towards reducing spam by providing inaccurate 
information for the reconnaissance queries. Examples of 
countermeasures include a DNSBL communicating to a bot-
master that a bot was not listed in the DNSBL when in fact it 
was, causing the botmaster to send spam from IP addresses 
that victims would be able to more easily identify and block. 
As another example, a DNSBL could tell a botmaster that a 
bot was listed in the blacklist when in fact it was not, poten-
tially causing the botmaster to abandon (or change the use of) 
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a machine that would likely be capable of successfully send-
ing spam. The DNSBL could also be intergrated with a sys-
tem that performs bot detection heuristics, as shown in FIG. 
14. FIG. 14 illustrates spamming bots and a C&C performing 
reconnaissance, attempting to get DNSBL information. 
Legitimate DNSBL lookups from a victim's computer are 
also being requested. A DNSBL responds to the bots, the 
C&C, and the legitimate computer, but the DNSBL may 
respond in different ways. For example, the DNSBL may tell 
the bot computers wrong information in response to their 10 
DNSBL requests in order to confuse the botnet, while return-
ing correct information to legitimate servers. 
In addition, a kuownreconnaissance query could be used to 
boost confidence that the IP address being queried is in fact 
also a spamming bot. Furthermore, DNSBL lookup traces 15 
would be combined with other passively collected network 
data, such as SMTP connection logs. For example, a DNSBL 
query executed from a mail server for some IP address that did 
not recently receive an SMTP connection attempt from that IP 
address also suggests reconnaissance activity. 20 
DNS Cache Snooping 
FIGS. 17-18 illustrate a technique to estimate the popula-
tion of bots within a network through DNS cache inspection 
or snooping, according to one embodiment of the invention. 
DNS non-recursive queries (or resolution requests for 25 
domains that the DNS server is not authoritative for) are used 
16 
unknown domain, we can then surmise that the domain is 
used for malicious purposes (e.g., botnet coordination). 
Referring to FIG. 17, one embodiment of a DNS cache 
inspection technique is as follows: In 1705, probes are done 
for open recursion, and open recursive servers are identified. 
Open recursive servers are servers that will perform recursive 
DNS lookups on behalf of queries originating outside of their 
network. In 1710, priority ranking of domains is performed. 
(This process is described in more detail later.) The output of 
1705 and 1710 (which can be independent phases) is then 
used in a non-recursive query in 1715. In 1720, analysis is 
performed, including: (a) determining the relative ranking of 
botnet sizes, (b) estimating the number of infected individu-
als/bots within a botnet, and ( c) assessing whether and to what 
extent a given network has infected computers. Since infec-
tions are dynamic, ongoing probes are needed. Thus, the 
analysis from 1720 can also be used to redo 1715 and priori-
tize the work performed in 1715. 
Identifying Open Recursive Servers 
Open recursive servers can be identified to, for example: 
(a) estimate botnet populations, (b) compare the relative sizes 
of botnets, and ( c) determine if networks have botnet infec-
tions based on the inspection of open recursive DNS caches. 
Open recursive DNS servers are DNS servers that respond 
to any user's recursive queries. Thus, even individuals outside 
of the network are permitted to use the open recursive DNS 
server. The cache of any DNS server stores mappings 
between domain names and IP addresses for a limited period 
of time, the TTL period, which is described in more detail 
above. The presence of a domain name in a DNS server's 
cache indicates that, within the last TTL period, a user had 
requested that domain. In most cases, the user using the DNS 
server is local to the network. 
In 1705 of FIG. 17, networks are scanned for all DNS 
to check the cache in a large number of DNS servers on the 
Internet to infer how many bots are present in the network 
served by each DNS server. DNS non-recursive queries 
instruct the DNS cache not to use recursion in finding a 30 
response to the query. Non-recursive queries indicate in the 
query that the party being queried should not contact any 
other parties if the queried party cannot answer the query. 
Recursive queries indicate that the party being queried can 
contact other parties if needed to answer the query. 
In general, most domain names that are very popular, and 
thus used extensively, are older, well-kuowndomains, such as 
google.com. Because of the nature of botnets, however, 
although they are new, they are also used extensively because 
bots in the botnet will query the botnet C&C machine name 40 
more frequently at the local Domain Name Server (LDNS), 
and hence, the resource record of the C&C machine name will 
appear more frequently in the DNS cache. Since non-recur-
sive DNS queries used for DNS cache inspection do not alter 
the DNS cache (i.e., they do not interfere with the analysis of 45 
bot queries to the DNS), they can be used to infer the bot 
population in a given domain. Thus, when the majority of 
local DNS servers in the Internet are probed, a good estimate 
35 servers, and the networks identify the servers that are open 
recursive DNS servers. A DNS server (and thus, an open 
recursive DNS server) can be operated at almost any address 
within the IPv4 space (i.e., that portion not reserved for spe-
of the bot population in a botnet is found. 
DNS cache inspection utilizes a TTL (time-to-live) value 50 
(illustrated in FIG.18) of the resource recordofa botnet C&C 
domain to get an accurate view of how long the resource 
record stays in the DNS cache. (Note that IP addresses change 
and/or the DNS server can only remember cache information 
for a certain amount of time.) When the resource record is 55 
saved in the cache, (e.g., as a result of the first DNS look up of 
the C&C domain from the network), it has a default TTL 
value, set by the authoritative DNS server. As time goes on, 
the TTL value decreases accordingly until the resource record 
is removed from the cache when the TTL value drops to zero. 60 
Referring to FIG. 18, three caching episodes are illustrated, 
each with a beginning point in time bl, b2, and b3, and an end 
point in time el, e2, e3. The distance between caching epi-
sodes is described as Tl, T2, etc. Thus, if we see many 
caching episodes (or "shark fins") on FIG. 18, we can deter- 65 
mine that a large number ofhosts are attempting to contact the 
C&C domain. If the C&C domain is a relatively new and 
cial use). We refer to this usable IPv4 address space as a 
"mutable address". 
To speed up the search for all DNS servers on the Internet, 
1705 breaks up the mutable space into organizational units. 
The intuition is that not all IPv4 addresses have the same 
probability of running a DNS server. Often, organizations run 
just a handful of DNS servers, or even just one. The discovery 
of a DNS server within an organizational unit diminishes (to 
a non-zero value) the chance that other addresses within the 
same organization's unit are also DNS servers. 
1705 is explained in more detail in FIG. 19, according to 
one embodiment of the invention. In 1905, the IPv4 mutable 
addresses (using, for example, Request for Comments (RFC) 
3330) (note that an RFC is a document in which standards 
relating to the operation of the Internet are published) is 
organized into organizational units (using for example, RFC 
1446). In 1910, for each organizational unit in 1905, the 
following calculations are performed to obtain the classless 
interdomain routing (CIDR) Priority Ranking Score 
("CPRS"): 
a. For each DNS server kuown to exist in the organizational 
unit, add 1.0. 
b. For each IP address unit that has previously been seen to 
not run a DNS server, add 0.01. 
c. For each IP address unit for which no information is 
available, add 0.1. 
In 1915, the organizational units are sorted in descending 
order according to their CPRS values. 
Domain Ranking 
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1710 of the DNS cache inspection process (which can be 
independent ofl 705) produces a set of candidate domains. In 
other words, this phase generates a list of "suspect" domains 
that are likely botnet C&C domains. There are multiple tech-
nologies for deriving such a suspect list. For example, one can 
use DDNS or IRC monitoring to identify a list of C&C 
domains. Those of ordinary skill in the art will see that DDNS 
monitoring technologies can yield a list ofbotnet domains. 
Cache Inspection 
1715 of the DNS cache inspection process combines the 
outputs ofl 705and1710. Foreachdomainidentifiedin 1710, 
a non-recursive query is made to each non-recursive DNS 
server identified in 1705. Thus, for the top N entries (i.e., the 
N units with the lowest scores in 1915), the following steps 
are performed to determine ifthe DNS server is open recur-
sive: 
a. A non-recursive query is sent to the DNS server for a 
newly registered domain name. This step is repeated with 
appropriate delays until the server returns an NXDOMAIN 
answer, meaning that no such domain exists. 
b. A recursive query is then immediately sent to the DNS 
server for the same domain name used in the previous non-
recursive query. If the answer returned by the DNS server is 
the correct resource record for the domain (instead ofNXDO-
MAIN), the DNS server is designated as open recursive. 
Determine Number of DNS Servers 
Once an open recursive server is discovered, its cache can 
be queried to find the server's IP address. Often the server's IP 
address can be hard to discover because of server load bal-
ancing. Load balancing is when DNS servers are clustered 
into a farm, with a single external IP address. Requests are 
handed off (often in round-robin style) to an array of recursive 
DNS machines behind a single server or firewall. This is 
illustrated in FIG. 20. Each DNS machine maintains its own 
unique cache, but the DNS farm itself presents a single IP 
address to outside users. Thus, an inspection of the DNS 
cache state could come (randomly) from any of the machines 
behind the single load balancing server or firewall. 
This problem is addressed by deducing the number ofDNS 
machines in a DNS farm. Intuitively, multiple non-recursive 
inspection queries are issued, which discover differences in 
TTL periods for a given domain. This indirectly indicates the 
presence of a separate DNS cache, and the presence of more 
than one DNS server behind a given IP address. 
FIG. 21 illustrates a procedure used to deduce the number 
of DNS servers behind a load balancing server or firewall, 
according to one embodiment of the present invention. For 
each open recursive DNS server (ORN), it is determined ifthe 
DNS service is behind a load balancing server or firewall and 
if so the number of servers is estimated as follows: In 2105, 
thenumberofAssumedDNS Servers (or"ADS") is set to "1". 
In 2110, an existing domain is recursively queried for, and the 
TTL response time is observed. This can be called the TTL 
response TTL0 , and can be placed into a table of Known TTL 
Values ("KTV"). In 2115, a period ofw u w2 , and w3 seconds 
is waited, where all values ofw are less than all KTV entries. 
In2120, afterw 1 , w2 , w3 seconds, another query is sent to the 
server. The corresponding TTL response times are observed 
and called TTL1 , TTL2 , and TTL3 . In2125, ifw1 +TTL1 does 
not equal any value already in KTV, then TTL1 is entered into 
the KTV table, and the number of ADS's is incremented by 
one. This is repeatedforw2 +TTL2 , and w3 +TTL3 . In2130, it 
is determined if the ADS count has not been incremented. If 
not, in 2140, the system is exited. If yes, steps 2120-2130 are 
repeated until the number of ADS' s does not increase. 
Some load balancing is performed by a load balancing 
switch (often in hardware) that uses a hash of the 4-tuple of 
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the source destination ports and IP addresses to determine 
which DNS server to query. That is, queries will always reach 
the same DNS server if the queries originate from the same 
source IP and port. To accommodate this type ofload balanc-
ing, a variation of the above steps can be performed. 2115 
through 2135 can be performed on different machines with 
distinct source IPs. (This may also be executed on a single 
multihomed machine that has multiple IP addresses associ-
ated with the same machine and that can effectively act as 
10 multiple machines.) Thus, instead of starting three threads 
from a single source IP address, three machines may each 
start a single thread and each be responsible for querying the 
DNS server from a distinct source IP. One of the machines is 
elected to keep track of the ADS count. The distributed 
15 machines each wait for a separate wait period, w 1 , w 2 , and w 3 , 
per step 2115. The distributed machines coordinate by report-
ing the outcome of the results in steps 2120-2130 to the 
machine keeping track of the ADS count. 
If all DNS queries use only (stateless) UDP packets, the 
20 queries may all originate from the same machine, but forge 
the return address of three distinct machines progranimed to 
listen for the traffic and forward the data to the machine 
keeping track of the ADS count. 
Once the ADS count has been determined for a given DNS 
25 server, cache inspection can be performed according to the 
procedure in FIG. 22. In 2205, each domain identified in 1710 
is called a Domains. For each Domains, the DNS start of 
authority (SOA) is consulted forthe TTL. This value is called 
TTLsoA In 2210, for an ORN, x threads are created, where 
30 x=ADS*2 (2 times the number of Assumed DNS Servers). 
The threads are synchronized to perform DNS queries simul-
taneously according to the following procedure. For 
Domains, 
A master thread waits for half the TTLsoA period, and then 
35 instructs the child threads to send their DNS queries. (Since 
there are twice as many queries as ADS, there is a high 
probability that each of the DNS servers will receive once of 
the queries.) 
If any of the threads querying an 0 RN (an open recursive 
40 DNS server) reports the ORN not having a cache entry for 
Domains, repeat step (a) immediately. 
If all of the threads reports that the ORN has a cache entry 
for Domains, the smallest returned TTL for all of the threads 
is called TTLmim and all of the threads for TTLmin -1 seconds 
45 sleep before waking to repeat step (a). 
In 2215, the above cycle, from 2210(a) to 2210(c), builds a 
time series data set of Domains with respect to an open recur-
sive DNS server. This cycle repeats until Domains is no 
longer of interest. This occurs when any of the following 
50 takes place: 
a. Domains is removed from the list of domains generated 
by 1710. That is, Domains is no longer of interest. 
b. For a period of x TTLsoA consecutive periods, fewer than 
y recursive DNS servers identified in 1705 have any cache 
55 entries for Domains- That is, the botnet is old, no longer 
propagating, and has no significant infected population. In 
practice, the sum of the x TTLSOA period may total several 
weeks. 
In 2220, the cycle from steps 2210(a) to 2210(c) can also 
60 stop when the open recursive DNS server is no longer listed as 
open recursive by 1705 (i.e., the DNS server can no longer be 
queried). 
Analysis 
The analysis phase 1720 takes the cache observations from 
65 1715, and for each domain, performs population estimates. In 
one embodiment, the estimates are lower and upper bound 
calculations of the number of infected computers in a botnet. 
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For M observations, the estimated upper bound ( u) arrival 
rate "-u is: 
For example, a botnet could be estimated to have between 
10,000 and 15,000 infected computers. One assumption 
made is that the requests from all the bots in a network follow 
the same Poisson distribution with the same Poisson arrival 
rate. In a Poisson process, the time interval between two 
consecutive queries is exponentially distributed. We denote 
the exponential distribution rate as A. Each cache gap time 
interval, T,, ends with a new DNS query from one bot in the 
local network, and begins some time after the previous DNS 
query. Thus, in FIG. 18, the cache interval for the first bat's 
request occurs between b1 and e1 . The time interval T 1 mea-
sures the distance between the end of the first caching episode 
eu and the start of the second b2 . 
The population of victims needed to generate the upper 
10 bound arrival rate "-u can therefore be estimated as: 
As illustrated in FIG. 18, for a given domain, each name 
resolution (DNS query) by a bot triggers a caching event with 15 
a fresh TTL value that decays linearly over time. The time 
between any two caching episodes is designated T,. The 
"memoryless" property of exponential distribution indicates 
that the cache gap time interval T, follows the same exponen-
tial distribution with the same rate A, no matter when the 20 
cache gap time interval begins. A function is said to be memo-
ryless when the outcome of any input does not depend on 
prior inputs. All exponentially distributed random variables 
are memoryless. In the context of the DNS cache inspection, 
this means that the length of the current cache interval T, does 25 
not depend on the length of the previous cache interval T,_ 1 . 
Lower Bound Calculation. 
CONCLUSION 
While various embodiments of the present invention have 
been described above, it should be understood that they have 
been presented by way of example, and not limitation. It will 
be apparent to persons skilled in the relevant art( s) that vari-
ous changes in form and detail can be made therein without 
departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. In 
fact, after reading the above description, it will be apparent to 
one skilled in the relevant art(s) how to implement the inven-
tion in alternative embodiments. Thus, the present invention 
should not be limited by any of the above-described exem-A lower bound can be calculated on the estimated bot 
population. For the scenario depicted in the figure above, 
there was at least one query that triggered the cache episode 
from b 1 to e1 . While there may have been more queries in each 
caching episode, each caching event from b, toe, represents at 
least a single query. 
30 plary embodiments. 
In addition, it should be understood that the figures and 
algorithms, which highlight the functionality and advantages 
of the present invention, are presented for example purposes 
only. The architecture of the present invention is sufficiently 
If A1 is a lower bound (I) for the arrival rate, and T, is the 
delta between two caching episodes, and M is the number of 
observations, for M+l cache inspections, A1 can be estimated 
35 flexible and configurable, such that it may be utilized in ways 
other than that shown in the accompanying figures and algo-
rithms. 
as: Further, the purpose of the Abstract of the Disclosure is to 
enable the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the public 
Using analysis of a bot (e.g., by tools for bot binary analy-
sis), the DNS query rate A can be obtained for each individual 
bot. Then from the above formula, the estimate of the bot 
population Nz, in the network can be derived as follows: 
40 generally, and especially the scientists, engineers and practi-
tioners in the art who are not familiar with patent or legal 
terms or phraseology, to determine quickly from a cursory 
inspection the nature and essence of the technical disclosure 
of the application. The Abstract of the Disclosure is not 
45 intended to be limiting as to the scope of the present invention 
in anyway. 
50 
Upper Bound Calculation. 
During a caching period, there are no externally observable 55 
effects of bot DNS queries. In a pathological case, numerous 
queries could arrive just before the end of a caching episode, 
e,. An upper bound can be calculated on the estimated bot 
population. Define "-u as the upper bound estimate of the 
Poisson arrival rate. For the upper bound estimate, there are 60 
queries arriving between the times b, and e,. The time inter-
vals T,, however, represent periods of no arrivals, and can be 
treated as the sampled Poisson arrival time intervals of the 
underlying Poisson arrival process. It is fundamental that 
random, independent sample drawn from a Poisson process is 65 
itself a Poisson process, with the same arrival rate. This sam-
pling is called the "Constructed Poisson" process. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A method of detecting a collection of compromised 
networks and/or computers, comprising: 
performing processing associated with collecting Domain 
Name System (DNS) data, utilizing a detection system 
in communication with a database, the DNS data gener-
ated by a DNS server and/or similar device, wherein the 
DNS data comprises DNS queries, wherein the collected 
DNS data comprises DNS query rate information, and 
wherein the collecting DNS data from the DNS server 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with identifying a 
command and control (C&C) computer in a first net-
work, comprising: 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether a computer has a suspicious DNS request 
rate, comprising: performing processing associ-
ated with calculating a canonical sub-level domain 
(SLD) request rate for a given SLD, wherein the 
canonical SLD request rate is calculated as the total 
number of requests to third level domains (3LDs) 
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present in the given SLD plus any request to the 
given SLD, and performing processing associated 
with determining whether the canonical SLD 
request rate of the given SLD significantly deviates 
from the mean of canonical request rates of SLDs; 
when the DNS request rate is suspicious, performing 
processing associated with determining whether 
the DNS data has an exponential request rate com-
prising: performing processing associated with 
sorting DNS request rates per epoch, and perform- 10 
ing processing associated with determining 
whether there is exponential activity over a longer 
time epoch; and 
when the DNS data has an exponential request rate, 
performing processing associated with identifying 15 
the computer as the C&C computer; and 
performing processing associated with recording an IP 
address and/or traffic information from a compromised 
computer when the compromised computer contacts 
another computer; 
performing processing associated with examining the col-
lected DNS data relative to DNS data from known com-
prised and/or uncompromised computers; and 
20 
performing processing associated with determining an 
existence of the collection of compromised networks 25 
and/or computers, and/or an identity of compromised 
networks and/or computers, based on the examination. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein collecting DNS data 
further comprises: 
performing processing associated with replacing an IP 30 
address of the C&C computer with an IP address of 
another computer, causing the compromised computer 
seeking to contact the C&C computer to be redirected to 
the other computer. 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the other computer is a 35 
sinkhole computer. 
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising: 
performing processing associated with observing time 
zone and time of release information for the collected 
data. 
5. The method of claim 1, wherein determining the exist-
ence of the collection of compromised networks and/or com-
puters is accomplished without contacting any networks or 
computers in the collection of compromised networks and/or 
computers. 
6. The method of claim 2, further comprising: 
performing processing associated with isolating the collec-
tion of compromised networks and/or computers from 
40 
45 
its C&C computer, causing the collection of compro-
mised networks and/or computers to lose the ability to 50 
act as a coordinated group. 
7. The method of claim 2, further comprising: 
22 
ated by a DNS server and/or similar device, wherein the 
DNS data comprises DNS queries, wherein the collected 
DNS data comprises DNS query rate information, and 
wherein the collecting DNS data from the DNS server 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with identifying a 
command and control (C&C) computer in a first net-
work, comprising: 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether a computer has a suspicious DNS request 
rate, comprising: performing processing associ-
ated with calculating a canonical sub-level domain 
(SLD) request rate for a given SLD, wherein the 
canonical SLD request rate is calculated as the total 
number of requests to third level domains (3LDs) 
present in the given SLD plus any request to the 
given SLD, and performing processing associated 
with determining whether the canonical SLD 
request rate of the given SLD significantly deviates 
from the mean of canonical request rates of SLDs; 
when the DNS request rate is suspicious, performing 
processing associated with determining whether 
the DNS data has an exponential request rate com-
prising: performing processing associated with 
sorting DNS request rates per epoch, and perform-
ing processing associated with determining 
whether there is exponential activity over a longer 
time epoch; and 
when the DNS data has an exponential request rate, 
performing processing associated with identifying 
the computer as the C&C computer; and 
performing processing associated with recording an IP 
address and/or traffic information from a compro-
mised computer when the compromised computer 
contacts another computer; 
performing processing associated with examining the 
collected DNS data relative to DNS data from known 
comprised and/or uncompromised computers; and 
performing processing associated with determining an 
existence of the collection of compromised networks 
and/or computers, and/or an identity of compromised 
networks and/or computers, based on the examina-
tion. 
10. The system of claim 9, wherein collecting DNS data 
further comprises: 
performing processing associated with replacing an IP 
address of the C&C computer with an IP address of 
another computer, causing the compromised computer 
seeking to contact the C&C computer to be redirected to 
the other computer. 
11. The system of claim 10, wherein the other computer is 
a sinkhole computer. analyzing traffic from the compromised computer to the 
sinkhole computer to obtain information about a mal-
ware author. 
12. The system of claim 10, wherein the computer is further 
55 capable of: 
8. The method of claim 4, further comprising: 
utilizing time zone and time of release information to pre-
dict optimal release time information for an attack. 
9. A system for detecting a collection of compromised 
networks and/or computers, comprising: 
a computer, adapted to receive Domain Name System 
(DNS) data from a DNS server utilizing a detection 
system in communication with a database, the detection 
system configured for: 
performing processing associated with observing time 
zone and time of release information for the collected 
data. 
13. The system of claim 9, wherein determining the exist-
60 ence of the collection of compromised networks and/or com-
puters is accomplished without contacting any networks or 
computers in the collection of compromised networks or 
computers. 
performing processing associated with collecting Domain 65 
Name System (DNS) data, utilizing a detection system 
14. The system of claim 10, wherein the detection system 
is further configured for: 
performing processing associated with isolating the collec-
tion of compromised networks and/or computers from in communication with a database, the DNS data gener-
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its C&C computer, causing the collection of compro-
mised networks and/or computers to lose the ability to 
act as a coordinated group. 
15. The system of claim 10, wherein the detection system 
is further configured for: 
performing processing associated with analyzing traffic 
from the compromised computer to the sinkhole com-
puter to obtain information about a malware author. 
16. The system of claim 12, wherein the detection system 
is further configured for: 
performing processing associated with utilizing time zone 
and time of release information to predict optimal 
release time information for an attack. 
17. The method of claim 1, wherein collecting DNS data 
comprises: 
10 
15 
24 
performing processing associated with identifying a list of 
known and/or probably legitimate IP addresses using a 
DNSBL service; 
for each of the known and/or probably legitimate IP 
addresses, performing processing associated with deter-
mining its average look-up arrival rate; 
performing processing associated with determining an 
average look-up arrival rate from the source IP address; 
performing processing associated with comparing the 
average look-up rates of the known and/or probably 
legitimate IP addresses to the arrival rate from the source 
IP address; and 
when the average look-up rates of the known and/or prob-
ably legitimate IP addresses differ significantly from the 
arrival rate from the source IP address, performing pro-
cessing associated with designating the source IP 
address as a compromised computer. 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether a source Internet Protocol (IP) address perform-
ing reconnaissance belongs to a compromised computer, 
the source IP address looking up at least one subject IP 
addresses; and 
23. The method of claim 22, wherein identifying a list of 
20 known IPs comprises: 
when the DNSBL service has controlled access, perform-
ing processing associated with recording IP addresses of 
approved users. 
when the source IP is known to belong to a compromised 
computer, performing processing associated with desig-
nating the at least one subject IP addresses as a compro-
mised computer. 
18. The method of claim 17, wherein determining whether 
the source IP address belongs to a compromised computer 
comprises: 
24. The method of claim 22, wherein identifying a list of 
25 probably legitimate IPs comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether the source IP address is a known compromised 
computer utilizing a DNS-based Blackhole List 30 
(DNSBL) and/or another list of compromised comput-
ers. 
19. The method of claim 18, wherein determining whether 
the source IP address belongs to a compromised computer 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether the source IP address is also the subject IP 
address. 
35 
20. The method of claim 18, wherein determining whether 
the source IP address belongs to a compromised computer 40 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining a look-
up ratio for the source IP address, the look-up ratio 
comprising the number of IP addresses the source IP 
address queries divided by the number of IP addresses 45 
that issue a look-up for the source IP address; and 
when the look-up ratio for the source IP address is high, 
designating the source IP address as a compromised 
computer. 
21. The method of claim 18, wherein determining whether 50 
the source IP address belongs to a compromised computer 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining a look-
when the DNSBL service allows anonymous access, per-
forming processing associated with monitoring the 
source IP addresses of incoming look-up requests, and 
recording these source IP addresses; 
performing processing associated with connecting to the IP 
address to determine whether the IP address is running 
on a known server; and 
when the IP address is running on a known server, perform-
ing processing associated with designating the IP 
address as probably legitimate. 
25. The system of claim 9, wherein collecting DNS data 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether a source Internet Protocol (IP) address perform-
ing reconnaissance belongs to a compromised computer, 
the source IP address looking up at least one subject IP 
addresses; and 
when the source IP is known to belong to a compromised 
computer, performing processing associated with desig-
nating the at least one subject IP addresses as a compro-
mised computer. 
26. The system of claim 25, wherein determining whether 
the source IP address belongs to a compromised computer 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether the source IP address is a known compromised 
computer utilizing DNSBL and/or another list of com-
promised computers. 
up ratio for the source IP address, the look-up ratio 
comprising the number of IP addresses the source IP 
queries divided by the number ofIP addresses that issue 
a look-up for the source IP address; 
27. The system of claim 25, wherein determining whether 
55 the source IP address belongs to a compromised computer 
when the look-up ratio for the source IP address is low, 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether the look-up arrival rate mirrors the email arrival 60 
rate; and 
the look-up arrival rate does not mirror the email arrival 
rate, performing processing associated with designating 
the source IP address as a compromised computer. 
22. The method of claim 21, wherein determining whether 65 
the look-up arrival rate mirrors the email arrival rate further 
comprises: 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether the source IP address is also the subject IP 
address. 
28. The system of claim 25, wherein determining whether 
the source IP address belongs to a compromised computer 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining a look-
up ratio for the source IP address, the look-up ratio 
comprising the number of IP addresses the source IP 
address queries divided by the number of IP addresses 
that issue a look-up for the source IP address; and 
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when the look-up ratio for the source IP address is high, 
performing processing associated with designating the 
source IP address as a compromised computer. 
29. The system of claim 25, wherein determining whether 
the source IP address belongs to a compromised computer 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with determining a look-
up ratio for the source IP address, the look-up ratio 
comprising the number of IP addresses the source IP 
queries divided by the number ofIP addresses that issue 10 
a look-up for the source IP address; 
when the look-up ratio for the source IP address is low, 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether the look-up arrival rate mirrors the email arrival 
rate; and 15 
when the look-up arrival rate does not mirror the email 
arrival rate, performing processing associated with des-
ignating the source IP address as a compromised com-
puter. 
30. The system of claim 29, wherein determining whether 20 
the look-up arrival rate mirrors the email arrival rate further 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with identifying a list of 
known and/or probably legitimate IP addresses using a 
DNSBL service; 25 
for each of the known and/or probably legitimate IP 
addresses, performing processing associated with deter-
mining its average look-up arrival rate; 
performing processing associated with determining an 
average look-up arrival rate from the source IP address; 30 
performing processing associated with comparing the 
average look-up rates of the known and/or probably 
legitimate IP addresses to the arrival rate from the source 
IP address; and 
when the average look-up rates of the known and/or prob- 35 
ably legitimate IP addresses differ significantly from the 
arrival rate from the source IP address, performing pro-
cessing associated with designating the source IP 
address as a compromised computer. 
31. The system of claim 30, wherein identifying a list of 40 
known IPs comprises: 
when the DNSBL service has controlled access, perform-
ing processing associated with recording IP addresses of 
approved users. 
32. The system of claim 30, wherein identifying a list of 45 
probably legitimate IPs comprises: 
when the DNSBL service allows anonymous access, per-
forming processing associated with monitoring the 
source IP addresses of incoming look-up requests, and 
performing processing associated with recording these 50 
source IP addresses; 
performing processing associated with connecting to the IP 
address to determine whether the IP address is running 
on a known server; and 
when the IP address is running on a known server, perform- 55 
ing processing associated with designating the IP 
address as probably legitimate. 
33. The method of claim 1, wherein collecting DNS data 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with identifying open 60 
recursive DNS servers; and 
performing processing associated with priority ranking 
domain names. 
34. The method of claim 33, wherein the determining com-
prises: 65 
performing processing associated with utilizing the open 
recursive DNS servers and the priority-ranked domain 
26 
names to determine whether the open recursive DNS 
servers are compromised computers. 
35. The method of claim 34, further comprising: 
performing processing associated with ranking sizes of 
networks of compromised computers; 
performing processing associated with estimating a num-
ber of compromised computers in a network; 
performing processing associated with assessing to what 
extent a given network has compromised computers; 
performing processing associated with determining a 
lower bound calculation of a compromised computer 
population; or 
performing processing associated with determining an 
upper bound calculation of a compromised computer 
population; or 
any combination thereof. 
36. The method of claim 33, wherein identifying open 
recursive DNS servers comprises: 
performing processing associated with organizing IPv4 
mutable addresses into units; 
performing processing associated with determining a 
classless interdomain routing (CIDR) priority ranking 
score (CPRS) value for each unit utilizing DNS server 
information; 
performing processing associated with sorting the units a 
list in descending order utilizing the CPRS value; and 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether a DNS server is an open recursive DNS server 
for DNS servers in the top of the list. 
37. The method of claim 36, wherein determining the 
CPRS value comprises: 
performing processing associated with giving a value of 
1.0 for each DNS server known to exist in the unit; 
performing processing associated with giving a value of 
0.01 for each IP address known to run on a DNS server; 
and 
performing processing associated with giving a value of 
0.1 for each IP address with no DNS server information. 
38. The method of claim 34, wherein utilizing the open 
recursive DNS servers and the priority-ranked domains in a 
recursive query comprises: 
performing processing associated with sending at least one 
non-recursive query to the DNS server for a newly reg-
istered domain until the DNS server returns an NXDO-
MAIN answer; 
performing processing associated with immediately send-
ing a recursive query to the DNS server for the newly 
registered domain; and 
performing processing associated with designating the 
DNS server as open recursive when the answer returned 
by the DNS server is not NXDOMAIN. 
39. The method of claim 36, further comprising perform-
ing processing associated with determining the number of 
DNS servers behind a load balancing server. 
40. The system of claim 9, wherein collecting DNS data 
comprises: 
performing processing associated with identifying open 
recursive DNS servers; and 
performing processing associated with priority ranking 
domain names. 
41. The system of claim 40, wherein the determining com-
prises: 
performing processing associated with utilizing the open 
recursive DNS servers and the priority-ranked domain 
names to determine when the open recursive DNS serv-
ers are compromised computers. 
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42. The system of claim 41, further comprising: 
performing processing associated with ranking sizes of 
networks of compromised computers; 
performing processing associated with estimating a num-
ber of compromised computers in a network; 
performing processing associated with assessing to what 
extent a given network has compromised computers; 
performing processing associated with determining a 
lower bound calculation of a compromised computer 
population; or 10 
performing processing associated with determining an 
upper bound calculation of a compromised computer 
population; or 
any combination thereof. 
43. The system of claim 40, wherein identifying open 15 
recursive DNS servers comprises: 
performing processing associated with organizing IPv4 
mutable addresses into units; 
performing processing associated with determining a 
CPRS value for each unit utilizing DNS server informa- 20 
ti on; 
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performing processing associated with giving a value of 
1.0 for each DNS server known to exist in the unit· 
performing processing associated with giving a val~e of 
0.01 for each IP address known to run on a DNS server 
and ' 
performing processing associated with giving a value of 
0.1 for each IP address with no DNS server information. 
45. The system of claim 41, wherein utilizing the open 
recursive DNS servers and the priority-ranked domains in a 
recursive query comprises: 
performing processing associated with sending at least one 
non-recursive query to the DNS server for a newly reg-
istered domain until the DNS server returns an NXDO-
MAIN answer; 
performing processing associated with immediately send-
ing a recursive query to the DNS server for the newly 
registered domain; and 
when the answer returned by the DNS server is not NXDO-
MAIN, performing processing associated with designat-
ing the DNS server as open recursive. 
46. The system of claim 45, further comprising performing 
processing associated with determining the number of DNS 
servers behind a load balancing server. 
47. The method of claim 1, wherein the DNS data is non-
performing processing associated with sorting the units a 
list in descending order utilizing the CPRS value; and 
performing processing associated with determining 
whether a DNS server is an open recursive DNS server 
for DNS servers in the top of the list. 
25 recursive. 
44. The system of claim 43, wherein determining the CPRS 
value comprises: 
48. The system of claim 9, wherein the DNS data is non-
recursive. 
* * * * * 
